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Introduction 
 Many third world developing countries live in poverty because of the lack of 
financial infrastructure to support their economy. These countries have large sectors of 
small scale, unregistered businesses in their economy run by poor entrepreneurs. The 
entrepreneurs who represent the poorest of the poor or grassroots in their communities try 
to run these small businesses while suffering from an inadequately low level of capital 
because they do not have access to the formal financial system (i.e. commercialized 
banks, etc.). Even with great potential, the unavailability of financial services such as 
small-scale loans inhibits the growth and many times viability of these businesses. In 
response, making financial services to these small-scale poor entrepreneurs is thought of 
as a great solution for poverty relief in these developing economies. Therefore, 
development policy over the last 20 years has concentrated on microfinance as a poverty 
alleviation tool. Microfinance provision created the need for a sector of organizations 
driven by social welfare agendas. Non-profit organizations backed by donor capital with 
a social mission of poverty alleviation started forming to provide microfinance. These 
organizations also referred to as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) began 
extending loans to the poorest individuals and groups within the least developed 
economies of the world. With help from donors as external financiers and without other 
competitors because of regulation and disinterest, NGOs monopolized the market for 
microfinance. Through this monopoly, NGOs’ success demonstrated the potential 
profitability in microfinance. Now with relaxed regulations in these countries and proven 
profit potential, new commercial entrants in the form of licensed financial institutions 
have started to flood the industry.  
 In response to commercial entry, NGOs lost their monopoly power and 
consequently their market share. These banks, comparatively advantaged in providing 
financial services, have access to capital markets, more comprehensive financial 
products, and have the ability to mobilize savings. This financial efficiency has allowed 
them to extend loans at a lower rate and for a lower cost. NGOs dwindling market share 
forced them to reconsider how to survive in their no longer sheltered circumstances. 
(Rhyne 2000) NGOs have commonly used two strategies for surviving in the market: 
either changing their targeted clientele segments in the market or to transform themselves 
into regulated microfinance institutions (RFI). Although some NGOs have not changed in 
face of the competitive market, most organizations have chosen one of the above 
strategies.   
Theoretically, NGOs entered into microfinance in an effort increase the outreach 
of financial services to the grassroots. Market competition forced NGOs to alter their 
strategies in two main ways. In both cases, empirical evidence shows a drastic increase in 
the number of people served by these resulting altered NGOs. However, the increased 
provision has not come at a cost. The entrance of these formal lenders into the market 
brought a professional, profit seeking attitude to microfinance. This paper addresses the 
impact of NGOs altering their strategy and structure in response to formal lenders 
entrance into the microfinance market.  
Literary Review  
 When microfinance began to emerge as a developmental strategy in the early 
1980s, microfinance institutions (MFIs) controlled by donor backed NGOs held a 
monopoly on this market because of the disinterest and infeasibility of licensed financial 
institutions (formal lenders) in the market. This disinterest spawned from financial 
repression policies sanctioned by governments which included interest rate controls, 
limited entry into the financial sector, crowding out of private investment, credit 
requirements, and directed credit. Given the restrictive nature of these polices; formal 
lenders had little incentive to enter the market because these restrictive policies created 
significant barriers to entry.  
Accompanying these policies, formal lenders also faced other forms of resistance. 
These small scale loans created high transactions for them, and many of these low-
income households1 lack assets to qualify for their loans requiring collateral. (Morduch 
2000) Formal lenders, also, understood determining the quality of potential clients and 
monitoring their progress presents particularly difficult challenges when extending loans 
to the poor. Moral hazard and adverse selection created by these problems presented 
barriers to formal lenders because identifying quality clients who will maintain high 
repayment rates stands paramount to success in microfinance. Additionally, the poorly 
developed infrastructure increases the expense of delivering even basic financial needs. 
(Akanji 2001) Cumulatively, these problems increased the cost of extending 
microfinance loans to the poor which did not justify their entrance.  
Therefore, NGO controlled MFIs driven by social missions and backed by donor 
capital dominated the market because of their ability to control these problems. In an 
effort to combat low repayment rates from a naiveté selection of low quality clients, they 
came in close contact with their clientele. Through this closeness, NGOs marginally 
averted adverse selection and moral hazard, the two critical problems facing formal 
lenders. The development of personal ties and the use of borrower proximity in decision-
                                                 
1 Poor entrepreneurs are assumed to have come from low-income households. 
making served as mechanisms for countering these two problems. (Aryeetey 1997) Even 
more so in rural environments, the development of personal ties with clients helped 
confront information asymmetry.   
Close proximity to clientele, not only served the purpose of overcoming 
information asymmetry but also increased repayment rates through loan monitoring and 
contract enforcement. The mere presence of NGOs within the community led to higher 
repayment rates. (Aryeetey 1997) Also, NGOs’ development of personal relationships 
with potential clients allowed them to provide simple loan appraisal and rapid loan 
approvals. Other unique services provided included special features for potential clients 
who were illiterate, spoke a non-dominant language, or lacked confidence to apply. 
(Ryhne and Christen 1999) All of these personal services integrated into microfinance by 
NGOs made considerable headway towards successful lending to these targeted poor 
clientele.  
However, innovation of new lending techniques spurred by NGOs eventually led 
to the feasibility of successful poor community microfinance. After strides made by early 
organizations, donor funding flooded into NGOs. Now supported by strong streams 
donor capital, NGOs began to experiment with new techniques to successfully extend 
lending services. Since NGOs were not regulated, they could experiment a lot and there 
were not restrictions on what types of activities they could undertake. (Gonzalez-Vega 
1998) Through experimentation, innovative techniques spawned into the microfinance 
sector. The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, widely considered the most successful 
microfinance programs throughout the world, innovated a revolutionary lending 
technique catering to clients without collateral called group lending through Self-Help 
Groups (SHGs). (Yunus 2003) The groups form voluntarily, and while loans are made to 
individuals, all in the group are held responsible for loan repayment. If one member fails 
to repay the loan and defaults, then the entire group no longer has access to future loans. 
This technique connects the group by effectively making each member a co-signer on the 
loan for others in an effort to mitigate the problems created by information asymmetries. 
Group members now have the incentive to monitor each other and exclude specific 
people in the community from the group. (Morduch 1999) Grameen Bank identified a 
way to utilize local information and thereby creating a mechanism to rely on informal 
type of insurance.  
Along with utilizing SHGs in their lending practices, other NGOs have introduced 
new innovative techniques to increase repayment incentive such as dynamic incentives, 
regular repayment structures, and collateral substitutes. Programs that use dynamic 
incentives design their structure on a progressive lending basis. (Morduch 1999) Initially, 
clients can qualify for only small loans, but upon satisfactory repayment the loan size 
gradually increases. Regular repayment incentives aim to force clientele to form habits to 
repay a little at a time. Instead of the typical year long loan with the entire payment due at 
maturity, there are weekly payments. Regular repayment schedules acts as a screener of 
undisciplined clients as well as trains potential clients. The target clientele of NGOs 
typically lack assets for loan collateral, so many NGOs use substitutes for collateral 
instead. In the Grameen Bank model, clients contribute to an emergency fund where it 
provides relief in cases of default, death, disability, etc. The fund requires a five percent 
tax on the loan for each member of the SHG. If clients leave the SHG, the bank seizes 
what total amount the group owes, therefore, serving the function of partial collateral. 
These new innovations allowed NGOs to flourish in the market place alone without the 
competition from other forms of financial services.      
However, recent changes in the structure and composition of the microfinance 
market have sparked new interest for formal lenders and caused market liberalization. 
Four supporting indicators show how the above government sanctioned repressive 
policies started to subside. One, entry by foreign banks has increased the competition. 
Two, wide spread interest rate deregulation has now afforded banks pricing flexibility, 
opening up various potential profitable market niches where new financial products can 
be utilized. Three, the development of capital markets has drawn high-end clients away 
from commercial banks causing them to look to microfinance for primary sources of 
finance. Four, large, subsidized national development banks have gone bankrupt causing 
the clients on the margin of the poverty line looking for financial services. (Rhyne and 
Christen 1999) This liberalization caused the formal lending sector to realize this 
market’s potential profit. Accompanying market liberalization, these new innovative 
lending techniques, such as SHGs, introduced by NGOs catered to the set of problems 
previously limiting formal sector involvement. Uninhibited by regulation and equipped 
with new lending techniques, formal lenders entered into the microfinance market.  
Entrance by formal lenders into the microfinance market has changed the market 
composition and created a newly competitive environment. Lured by a vast market and 
by the success demonstrated by NGOs, various formal lenders have entered including 
large retail banks, state-owned institutions, small commercial banks, and finance 
companies2. (Christen 2000) Compared to NGOs, formal lenders’ financial efficiency led 
                                                 
2 “Formal lenders” is a term which encompasses these institutions because the differentiating ability 
between NGOs and formal lenders is access to commercial funds.   
to some distinct advantages in the market. Formal lenders have well established internal 
infrastructures capable of handling the large numbers of transactions and can offer a 
comprehensive line of financial products which results in the ability to handle and attract 
more microfinance clients than NGOs. (Rahman 2004) Also, these institutions have 
access to commercial funds which include capital markets and central bank discount 
windows. Contrasting starkly to sometimes volatile donor capital, commercial funds 
supply formal lenders with readily available lending capital at market price. Also, 
commercial capital has a much greater capacity to support portfolio growth and increase 
leverage. (Hishigsuren 2002) More importantly, the ability of formal lenders to mobilize 
savings has significant effect comparatively to NGOs. Regulation in most developing 
countries prohibits NGOs which are unregulated from collecting savings deposits because 
for proprietary purposes. By mobilizing these savings, a formal lender has the potential to 
fund its entire loan portfolio from these small-scale savings. (Moller 2002) With these 
comparative advantages in the market, formal lenders entered creating a highly 
competitive microfinance market.  
No longer enjoying monopoly positions, NGOs encounter a rapidly changing 
market because commercialization forced by formal lenders. Commercialization refers to 
the prospects for lower prices, new products and services, greater number and variety of 
market offerings, improved product and service quality, and technological innovations 
now present in the microfinance. (Moller 2002) Formal banks, privately owned and 
profit-seeking, entered into the market solely for the purpose of earning profits. 
Therefore, these institutions engaged in an act called client skimming. Client skimming is 
a process where formal lenders targeted the most profitable segments of this market (the 
clients hanging just below the poverty line or above). Since formal lenders offer lower 
interest rates than NGOs, they steal these clients. NGOs thereby are left with fewer 
relatively high-profit customers, directly reducing their financial returns. NGOs rely on 
the profitability of these loan clients to finance less profitable and arguably needier 
clientele. Consequently, this loss severely threatens the financial health of NGOs. (Moller 
2002) Therefore, in order to compete in this market, NGOs find themselves scrambling to 
adapt to the new market structure. 
In response, left with few options to combat this competitive pressure, some 
NGOs altered their initial targeted clientele segment. Padhi 2004 observed one option 
available to NGOs which included six possible alterations to their initial provisional 
goals. One, these NGOs would need to focus their portfolio concentration on higher 
density population areas and consequently not focus on more rural areas which were 
initially targeted. Secondly, NGOs would need to emphasize rapid initial loan volume 
growth often leading to poor portfolio quality. Thirdly, cost cutting of field staff salaries 
would be a necessary consequence and would cause high turnover and low morale while 
their work load from more clients had increased. Fourthly, NGOs would have to start to 
move towards the retail trade and service sectors with high cash flow and away from 
initially targeted sectors such as manufacturing. Fifthly, by concentrating on short-term 
loans in hopes of higher repayments, NGOs would have left out certain sectors that are 
cyclical in nature including agriculture which comprised a large target group previously. 
Sixthly, NGOs would find it necessary to move up the poverty scale and away from the 
poorest target group in order to maintain loan demand and repayment rates. While this 
behavior represents only a fraction of NGOs, these alterations require NGOs to sacrifice 
their original social mission of poverty alleviation at the grassroots level. While these 
results have been observed in the market, NGOs have also changed their structure in 
response to competitive pressure.  
Other NGOs have chosen to transform themselves into regulated microfinance 
institutions or RFIs. Through this transformation, NGOs benefit from the same 
comparative advantages that formal lenders had been utilizing. This institutional 
transformation allows NGOs access to new lines of capital available through commercial 
funds such as through capital markets3. No longer limited by volatile donor funding, 
commercial funds represent cheaper, readily available lending capital. Counteracting the 
high cost of providing small loans, readily available funds through the capital market 
allow for more extension provision of microfinance. (Hishigsuren 2006) Previously, 
donor funding was not sufficient enough to support this kind of portfolio growth which 
represents an incentive for transformation.   
 NGOs benefit from transforming into a RFI because of the availability of more 
financial of services. In most countries, regulation prohibits NGOs to provide clients with 
financial services other than credit and also does not allow NGOs to mobilize savings 
because of propriety and prudence reasons (savings custodianship requires statutory 
provisioning and the creation of reserves to cover liquidity and other risks where current 
legislation is not present). (Hishigsuren 2006) The ability to mobilize savings can play a 
large role to a RFI. Many of the poor do not own small-scale businesses with demand for 
credit but all of the poor have the ability to save or at least want it. In fact, this gap 
represents hundreds of millions around the world. Since this impact represents a large 
                                                 
3 Access to commercial funds such as capital markets is allowed because these NGOs are now regulated 
finance institutions whereby they are subject to new regulatory statutes in return.  
change on the balance sheet of RFIs, these organizations could use these deposits to turn 
around and loan out for increased provision, permitting reserve requirements. Also, 
today’s depositors could become tomorrow’s borrowers, so this could indirectly develop 
a future client pool. While these depositors continue to save, their asset accumulation will 
allow them to qualify for better loans in the future because these assets could represent 
collateral. (Morduch 2000) With these benefits of transforming into a RFI, NGOs could 
extend the provisional outreach of microfinance to even broader and poorer 
demographics, theoretically.  
 Setting aside for a moment outreach concerns with this alternative option for 
NGOs, the new market composition has changed the competitive nature of the market 
leading to negative externalities. When microfinance began, NGOs had considerable 
market power. In this type of market, clients did not have power and therefore could not 
exert any pressure on NGOs. When formal lenders began to enter, the market became 
competitive, and in response, clients gained market power. No longer satisfying for just 
access to financial services, clients became price sensitive and exerted consumer 
preferences. (Rhyne and Christen 2001) With the abundance of new firms in the market, 
clients have been able to act based on their personal perceived advantages.  
 Client freedom in the market has decreased the incentives to remain loyal and to 
maintain high repayment rates. Since funds are not as scarce as they used to be, the 
incentives to repay on time have decreased. (Vogelgesang 2001) The ease of receiving a 
new loan from another lender (either formal, RFI, or un-altered NGO) has drastically 
increased with the entrance of new lenders. With the lack of formalized credit 
information available in most developing countries to formal lenders, NGOs, and RFIs, 
escaping bad credit histories presents a new incentive to clients. (Rhyne and Christen 
2001) In result, many clients are taking loans from more than one institution and 
indebting themselves beyond their ability to repay. (Christen and Rosenberg 2000) When 
they fall indebt beyond their capacity to repay, clients are observed financing their 
repayments of one loan with another. (Christen 2000) In this newly competitive 
environment, clients have acted opportunistically and caused market decreases in 
repayment rates when maintaining high repayment rates is crucial to the success of 
microfinance when lending to clients with little or no collateral.   
 In response to the increasing rates of default in the market, untransformed NGOs 
have stayed true to their social mission regardless of the consequences suffered from 
competitive pressures from other microfinance lenders. NGOs entered into the 
microfinance industry to provide financial services to the very poor or grassroots with the 
goal of poverty alleviation. Since extending loans to the poorest of the poor has high 
transactions cost, many NGOs did not reach financial self-sufficiency (attained when 
income from operation plus donor capital equals cost from operation). However, self-
sufficiency was not required because of the subsidies that donor capital provided. With 
the introduction of a broader line of products from RFIs and formal lenders, NGOs lost 
most of their profitable market share in the form of client skimming. Remaining steadfast 
to their initial targeted segment, NGOs continue to finance to the poorest of the poor in 
an effort to minimize poverty even in the face of decreasing impact. Morduch 1999 
suggests that a commonly-used “squared poverty gap” should be used to assess impacts 
on poverty alleviation. The squared poverty gap suggests that raising a poorer client’s 
income by one dollar has five time greater impact than doing the same for a lesser client. 
Clearly, by this measure extending microfinance to the grassroots has more depth of 
outreach4 on poverty alleviation than does lending to the more profitable non-poor.  
 The decreasing repayment rates caused by externalities in the market compelled 
RFIs and formal lenders started inching up market to more profitable and therefore less 
needy segments of the market. When NGOs transform into a RFI, the structure of the 
organization alters, notably the governance. Congruent with formal lenders, RFIs have 
investors seeking profit-maximization. The governance structure changes from a Board 
of Directors answerable to social investors concerned with social welfare to investors 
(owners) seeking only financial returns. (Moller 2002) This does not mean that social 
gains are never considered by these organizations. It just means that since the Board has a 
fiduciary constraint to maximize the welfare of the investors. So when confronted with a 
trade-off between the interests of the investors or of the poor, the Board will have to give 
more weight to the interests of the profit seeking investors. (Moller 2002) Therefore, 
when faced with low repayment rates caused by externalities in the market, RFIs and 
formal lenders started to shift up-market and target a wealthier segment of the population 
in order to maximize profit.  
 By looking at the average loan size in the portfolios of RFIs and formal lenders, a 
tentative trend emerges to show an upward shift in their targeted markets. Data collected 
by Christen 2000 and Woller 2002 show strong signs an upward movement by regulated 
institutions. The average loan size of for-profit, regulated institutions was nearly twice as 
large as for NGOs which suggest that regulated lenders reach a distinctively profitable 
and wealthier clientele since larger loans imply a higher qualification which poor 
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contrasted to breadth of outreach which refers to lending to the most people or widest segment of the 
market.  
segments of the market do not. The fact that NGOs have a lower average loan size 
supports this statement that there exist poorer potential clients who only can support 
lower loan sizes.  
 In spite of the clear signs of a change in the targeted demographic, Christen 2000 
cautions that there are some other considerations and marginalizing the poor may not 
have taken place. First, larger loans do not necessarily indicate and upward shift. Larger 
loans simply could reflect a maturing portfolio and/or client group. In the early lending 
stages of regulated lenders, their portfolios could have been dominated by new clients 
and through incremental lending; the loan balances could have naturally grown along 
with the clients. Also, a more dynamic economy may require larger loans, and with the 
growth of these relative economies, this could have been necessary. The observed larger 
loans, therefore, could be the product of an aging microfinance market. Although the 
observed increase in average loan size of regulated institutions cannot suggest the up-
market drift trend alone, transformation seems to go hand in hand with it. Market 
entrance by formal lenders has created a competitive market causing firm transformation 
(in many cases) and the consequence, whether intended or circumstantial, marginalizing 
of the poor has resulted.  
NGO-Formal Lender Linkage Model 
 Recognition of untransformed NGOs loan sizes indicates the typed of clients 
served. Their lower average loan sizes indicate their extension of financial services to 
clients who do not qualify for higher loans. These untransformed NGOs remained 
steadfast to their social mission and to the initial purpose of microfinance of poverty 
alleviation by loaning to the grassroots. Even though there are strong incentives to reach 
self-sustainability5 by transforming into a RFI, the “squared poverty gap” suggests that 
concentrating on the grassroots level causes the greatest impact on poverty alleviation. A 
viable way to reach the grassroots segments of these populations would be to create a 
relationship between NGOs and formal lenders. This relationship would allow both of 
these types of organizations to specialize in their fields of comparative advantage while 
being centered on poverty alleviation.  
 With formal lenders specializing in the provision of financial services, NGOs 
could again concentrate on their comparative advantage of social intermediation. Social 
intermediation refers to the act of NGOs preparing potential clients to become 
responsible borrowers and savers, better manage their own finances or their financial 
groups, and help them put whatever social capital they have to more productive use. 
(Padhi 2004) This type of social intermediation intends to increase the human capital of 
these poor entrepreneurs. NGOs could separate into branches and then be dispersed 
among various locations in a given geographical area. Emulating traditional NGOs, these 
branches would be able to overcome the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Differing from other observed linkages, this social intermediation could these branches to 
tailor specific, individual loans to clients. The ability to individualize loans creates great 
social benefit. In comparison to linkages with SHGs, individual financial needs are not 
satisfied within these groups. Previously, this type of loan provision was infeasible, but 
this linkage with formal lenders would allow NGOs to specifically concentrate social 
intermediating and understanding the individual needs in their respective communities. 
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equal the cost of operating without the help from donor capital.  
Through this linkage individualized financial services from the client’s side (demand 
side) would be feasible. 
 On the financial side (supply side), formal lenders would be able to provide 
access to capital markets, the ability to mobilize savings and offer the widest range of 
financial services for these individualized financial services. Access to capital markets 
would lower the cost of capital normally supplied to the very poor therefore causing 
lower interest rates. It has been well documented that lowering interest rates allows 
poorer demographic segments of the population access to financial services. The potential 
impact of savings mobilization carries considerable positive effects such as the possibility 
of financing loans with savings deposits (other incentives described in the above 
sections). Offering a wider range of financial services helps tailor them to individuals. 
When the competition in microfinance had increased from the entrance of formal lenders, 
clients found themselves exerting consumer preferences based on their financial need. 
Contrary to traditional belief, loans do not provide the full range of financial service that 
client’s desire.  
 From this linkage, NGOs receive an intrinsic benefit by providing the poorest of 
the poor with financial services. However, formal lenders also receive a benefit from this 
linkage. The NGO could act as an agent of the formal lender. With ultimate control of the 
portfolios, the formal lender could charge a fee to the NGO in return for managerial 
control of the loan portfolios. The formal lender could set performance standards on the 
portfolio. In addition, formal lenders would still have the capacity to target the wealthier 
segments of the market without competition from NGOs. Previously, NGOs only targeted 
the wealthier segments because these clients provided profit to sustain their grassroots 
provision. This linkage between NGOs and formal lenders creates a relationship where 
NGOs can target the poor while formal lenders can target the wealthier segments without 
competition from either type of organization.  
 With comprehensive financial services tailored to clients, the incentive to default 
on a loan would be greatly diminished. If the composition of the market started to change 
and the entrance of these linking organizations began to dominate, there would still 
remain an incentive to default on a loan because of the ease of receiving another one from 
a competitor. In this instance, an information credit bureau would need to be assembled. 
An information credit bureau could keep track of bad credit histories and therefore 
eliminating a source of information asymmetry. Each NGO-formal lender linkage would 
find it beneficial to support an information credit bureau as it would greatly decrease the 
incentive to default on a loan and subsequently keep repayment rates high.   
Conclusion 
 Over the last 20 years, poverty alleviation has made great strides with the help of 
NGOs in the provision of microfinance. NGO controlled MFIs motivated by alleviating 
poverty from the grassroots up concentrated their provision to the poorest individuals in 
the most rural communities within these developing economies. NGOs were the first 
organizations to test microfinance in these markets deemed financially infeasible and 
therefore had monopoly power. Backed by anxious donor capital, NGOs found success in 
providing loans to poor demographics by using unique lending techniques. These 
successes spurred not only more donor capital which fostered experimentation by NGOs 
and ultimately innovation but also interest of potential profits from entrants. These 
innovations such as SHGs, dynamic incentives, regular repayment structures, etc. gave 
formal lenders new lending techniques to conquer a traditional disincentive to entry, low 
repayment rates from un-collateralized loans. With profit the main goal, formal lenders 
entered the market causing competition to drastically increase in this previously sheltered 
market. 
  Financially more efficient than NGOs, formal lenders out competed NGOs in the 
market forcing radical changes to the operation of NGOs. In an attempt to survive in the 
market, NGOs either altered their targeted clientele segment or transformed into a RFI. 
However, along with these adjustments, NGOs began providing financial services to 
wealthier clients. A trend of increasing average loan size of these institutions hints at the 
different targeted segment of the market. Other considerations needed credence though. 
The average loan size could have indicated a graduating clientele which shows that 
microfinance has been successful. However, the fact remains that NGOs within the same 
market have lower average loan sizes which highlights there effort to extend services to 
the poorest of the poor. RFIs that carried a social mission would have continued to use 
their graduating clients to find even poorer segments of the market in which case the 
average loan size there would not be as big of a discrepancy between the loans sizes of 
NGOs and RFIs. Given this fact, RFIs still had potential to reach down to poorer 
segments of the market. The constraint of being private owned and having profit 
maximizing investors limits this capacity.  
 In response, the NGO-Formal lender linkage provides a rough framework creating 
a relationship between these two types of organizations which aims to benefit parties. The 
relative efficiencies to NGOs, social intermediation, and formal lenders, financial service 
efficiency, complement each other. With social intermediation and a comprehensive 
range of financial products, individualized loans for poor entrepreneurs would potentially 
possible. Tailored financial services in these developing nations could be a promising 
way to alleviate poverty from the grassroots on up.  
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